I(7) The Machine Does Not Replace the Human. It Extends the Human.

Lately, I’ve been seeing so much hate directed at artists who use artificial intelligence (AI). Especially on Threads.

An artist uses AI to create an image. The comments arrive almost immediately: “That is not art. A machine made it. That is AI slop.”

Across the same internet, millions listen to electronic music. They buy tickets to see DJs perform with mixers, sequencers, samples and software. The machinery is not a scandal. It is part of the attraction.

Why is the machine welcome on the dance floor but unwelcome in the studio?

This is not an argument that all electronic music is effortless, or that every AI generated image deserves to be called art. It is a question about the standards by which technological creativity is judged. Those standards are often inconsistent.

Long before generative AI, professionals were paid to do work that computers helped them accomplish. Architects stopped drawing every line by hand. Designers adopted digital tools. Accountants stopped performing every calculation on paper. Nobody seriously proposed that the architect should work without design software to deserve a fee, or that an accountant should abandon spreadsheets to prove professional integrity.

Computer aided design was not a confession of incompetence. It was simply design.

Today the word “computer” is increasingly replaced by “AI”, as though an entirely different moral principle suddenly applies. Yet AI remains a computational technology. Its capabilities differ from earlier software, sometimes profoundly. But a change in what a tool can do does not, by itself, settle what its human user contributes.

People pay for a building that works, a calculation that is correct, a design that communicates. The tool is part of the process. It is not the entire explanation of the result.

Consider a familiar contrast. A touring band must rehearse, transport instruments, maintain equipment and perform its music in front of an audience. A DJ may arrive with a much smaller physical setup and construct a performance through recorded sound and electronic controls.

At the highest commercial level, the difference in fees can be astonishing. In October 2026, industry reporting quoted a Belgian festival organizer describing booking fees of €200,000 to €300,000 for particularly sought after DJs (VIP Booking, 2026). Those are exceptional reported appearance fees, not typical DJ income and not necessarily the artist’s take home pay.

For perspective, the 2023 UK Musicians’ Census reported that 43% of musicians earned less than £14,000 per year from music (Help Musicians & Musicians’ Union, 2023). This is annual income, not a fee per concert, and the figures concern different populations. But, also, live bands are paid a few thousand euros per concert, with all that equipment they have to carry around with them on tour. They cannot be used to calculate how much more a DJ earns than a band. But they reveal an uncomfortable contrast in the economic world of music: exceptional electronic performers can command enormous fees while many professional musicians struggle to make a living.

Apparently, the market has no general objection to music made or performed through machines.

And it should not. DJing can demand knowledge, timing, selection, anticipation and an understanding of how people respond to sound. Electronic producers may compose, program, improvise and perform in technically sophisticated ways. The point is not to diminish them. It is to ask why their use of machines is accepted as part of artistic practice while the presence of AI is sometimes treated as proof that no artist exists.

Who is actually doing the work?

The analogy is provocative, but not exact. A DJ is not simply someone who presses Play. A drum machine does not operate like a large language model. A DJ set and an AI generated painting are different artistic activities.

Nevertheless, there is a useful parallel: a person can create by directing a system rather than by manually producing every element of the output.

A DJ decides what the audience hears and when. A person working with generative AI can decide what to ask for, what to reject, what to retain and what to change. Some users accept the first result. Others spend hours testing possibilities, rewriting instructions, combining outputs and editing the final material outside the model.
The difference matters.

One prompt is not necessarily an artistic achievement. Neither is one click on a camera, one note on a keyboard or one movement of a mixing fader. The meaningful question is what happens around that action. Was there an idea? Were choices made? Was the result critically evaluated? Did the person shape something that would otherwise not exist in that form?
Creative work is not measured by the number of muscles involved.

Nor is it measured by the number of prompts. A hundred weak prompts do not automatically produce a meaningful work. The time spent on a process can demonstrate effort, but effort alone does not establish quality. What matters is the relationship between intention, judgment and result.

When a DJ gives a poor performance, the audience does not usually accuse the mixer of lacking musical talent. The DJ is criticized for the selections, the timing or the atmosphere. The machine is not expected to have taste.

Why should the logic change with AI?

If an AI assisted novel is dull, criticize its language and ideas. If an image is derivative, identify what is derivative. If a piece of music is lifeless, explain why. The fact that a machine participated may be relevant to authorship and ethics. It does not replace criticism of the work itself.

“Made with AI” describes part of a production process. It is not, on its own, an aesthetic verdict.

Of course, there are objections that cannot be dismissed with a DJ analogy. Training data, copyright, consent, labor displacement, deception and environmental costs raise real questions. They concern the conditions under which systems are built and used. A work can be aesthetically interesting and ethically problematic at the same time. Recognizing that distinction strengthens criticism rather than silencing it.

But a blanket declaration that AI assisted work cannot be art avoids the harder questions. How much human direction is enough? What counts as originality when tools have always influenced the work they help produce? Where does authorship begin when a person selects, transforms and takes responsibility for a machine generated result?

These questions deserve arguments, not reflexes.

Writing extended memory beyond the human brain. Instruments extended the human capacity to make sound. Calculators extended arithmetic. Computers expanded the speed and range of intellectual work.

Generative AI extends something else: the ability to formulate possible texts, images, sounds and solutions, then evaluate and revise them. That is a significant change. It can also make people dependent, careless or less skilled when judgment is surrendered to the system.

The crucial distinction is between using a tool to enlarge human agency and allowing a tool to substitute for it.

To describe AI as a new stage of human evolution is therefore a philosophical claim, not a biological one. The stronger argument is that human intelligence increasingly operates through external systems. AI is becoming part of that environment, just as writing and computing became part of it before.

The future will make the phrase “AI assisted” sound as ordinary as “computer aided” sounds today.

For now, the contradiction remains. A machine can play the rhythm, and the person behind the controls can be celebrated as an artist. A machine can help produce an image, and the person directing it may be dismissed before anyone looks at the image.

The machine is not the artist. But its presence does not mean the artist has disappeared.

Human intelligence has never existed in isolation from its tools. Artificial intelligence may become one of its most consequential extensions. The responsibility for what is made with it, and for how it is made, remains a human question.


References

Help Musicians & Musicians’ Union. (2023). Musicians’ Census: Financial insight report. https://cnm.fr/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Musicians-Census-Financial-Insight-Report-sept-23.pdf

VIP Booking. (2026, October 2). Belgian festival rethinks booking strategy amid rising DJ fees. https://www.vip-booking.com/news/ReadNews/festivals/9622/belgian-festival-rethinks-booking-strategy-amid-rising-dj-fees


How to cite this post:

Ahmed, O. (2026). The Machine Does Not Replace the Human. It Extends the Human. Notes on Language and Artificial Intelligence, I(7). https://turkoloji.net/notes/i7-the-machine-does-not-replace-the-human-it-extends-the-human

I(6) What Is Freedom and Why Linux Means Freedom?

We use the word freedom rather carelessly. We use it for political rights, personal choices, economic independence and sometimes for the ability to choose between two brands of coffee. We praise it, defend it and occasionally put it on a flag. Yet when technology enters the conversation, freedom suddenly becomes a much less fashionable subject. We want our computers to be fast, convenient and effortless. We want them to know what we need before we have to ask. We want everything synchronized, updated and available everywhere. Freedom is wonderful, of course. As long as it does not make anything complicated.

This is where Linux becomes interesting.

Not because Linux is perfect. It is not. Not because Linux is always easier, faster or more secure. Those arguments can keep enthusiasts occupied for years, and they usually produce more heat than light. Linux is interesting because it raises a question that most modern technology would prefer us not to ask: who is actually in control?

The question sounds more dramatic than it is. Nobody is usually standing behind our computer threatening us. There is no sinister figure in a dark room pressing buttons while we watch helplessly. Modern technological control is much more sophisticated than that. It usually looks like convenience.

  • Click here and everything will be synchronized.
  • Accept this and the service will work.
  • Create an account and your settings will follow you everywhere.
  • Allow access and the application will become easier to use.
  • Install the update and you will not have to worry about it.

There is nothing particularly frightening about any individual decision. Most of them are perfectly reasonable. The interesting part is what happens when thousands of such decisions are made for us over the course of years. At some point, we may discover that we have not exactly lost our freedom. We have simply stopped exercising it.

That distinction matters.

Freedom does not mean that we must personally control everything. Nobody wants to spend the morning examining the source code of their refrigerator, and nobody should be morally condemned for allowing a car mechanic to repair their car. We delegate constantly. We trust other people because modern life would be impossible otherwise.

The problem is not delegation. The problem is the disappearance of alternatives.

There is a considerable difference between saying, “I trust this system, so I will let it make this decision for me,” and saying, “I have no meaningful way of making the decision myself.” The first is a choice. The second is dependence.

Linux sits somewhere in the space between those two conditions, and that is precisely why it is worth discussing.

A Linux user is not automatically free. A Linux installation does not magically remove corporations, surveillance, proprietary hardware or online dependence from a person’s life. Someone can run Debian while spending most of the day inside Google’s, Microsoft’s or Apple’s ecosystem. Someone can defend free software passionately while using proprietary applications every day. Human beings are very good at living with contradictions.

Linux does not solve those contradictions.

It exposes them.

Consider the idea of ownership. We have a fairly clear understanding of what it means to own a physical object. If you buy a chair, you can paint it. You can cut it into pieces. You can put it in the garden. You can decide that it was a terrible purchase and throw it away. The chair does not contact its manufacturer to ask whether you are still authorized to sit on it.

Digital ownership is different.

You can buy a computer and still discover that important parts of its operation are determined elsewhere. You can own a device while depending on software you cannot inspect, services you cannot modify and platforms you cannot leave without considerable inconvenience. You may physically possess the machine while having surprisingly little authority over what happens inside it.

Linux does not completely solve this problem either. But it represents a different idea of what the relationship between user and machine can be.

And this is where the usual discussion of Linux misses the point.

We tend to ask whether Linux is better than Windows. We compare desktop environments, applications, hardware compatibility, performance and usability. We discuss which distribution is best, which package manager is better and which desktop looks nicer. These questions are legitimate. They are also temporary. Today’s favorite distribution will eventually become yesterday’s favorite distribution, and nobody will remember which icon was located in which corner of the screen.

The philosophical question survives.

What should a person be allowed to do with the computer they own?

That question is considerably more interesting than whether one desktop environment uses slightly less memory than another.

Freedom becomes even more complicated when we consider convenience. We often assume that freedom and convenience naturally belong together. They do not. In many situations they point in opposite directions.

The more decisions a system makes for you, the easier it becomes to use. That is one of the great achievements of modern computing. We should not underestimate it. Nobody wants to configure every aspect of every application before being allowed to write an email.

But every decision that technology makes on our behalf is a decision we no longer have to make ourselves. Sometimes that is exactly what we want. Sometimes it is exactly what we should question.

There is no virtue in unnecessary difficulty.

That needs to be said clearly because discussions of Linux occasionally become romantic about inconvenience. A badly designed interface does not become philosophically profound merely because it is difficult to use. A confusing configuration file is not a declaration of freedom. A program that requires three hours of research to perform a task that another program accomplishes in thirty seconds has not necessarily made the world more liberated.

Freedom is not the same thing as suffering.

Nor is technical ignorance a moral failure.

Someone may simply want a computer that works. They may have no interest in package repositories, permissions, desktop environments or system configuration. They may consider all of that irrelevant to their life, and they have every right to do so.

The Linux philosophy becomes weaker, not stronger, when it treats such people with contempt.

A philosophy of freedom should be able to tolerate different choices.

This is one of the great contradictions within Linux culture. It has produced an impressive tradition of cooperation, knowledge sharing and technological independence. At the same time, parts of the community have developed a culture of technical elitism. The person who knows the right command sometimes behaves as though knowing the command makes him a better person.

It does not.

Knowing more about computers makes you more knowledgeable about computers. That is all.

The distinction matters because freedom is not a competition. It is not a badge that technically sophisticated people earn and everyone else fails to obtain. A person who chooses convenience is still making a choice. The important issue is whether the choice is genuinely available.

This brings us to another uncomfortable aspect of freedom.

Freedom creates responsibility.

If someone else controls your system, you can blame them when something goes wrong. If you control it yourself, the situation changes. You have more authority, but you also have more responsibility. You can choose your software, but you must decide what you trust. You can modify your system, but you can also damage it. You can reject somebody else’s decisions, but then you have to make your own.

Freedom gives things back to us.

Unfortunately, some of the things it gives back are responsibilities.

That is why people sometimes prefer dependence. Dependence can be comfortable. Someone else makes the decision. Someone else maintains the infrastructure. Someone else solves the problem. Someone else accepts the responsibility. We receive the convenience and rarely ask what we surrendered in exchange.

There is nothing shameful about this.

But there is something worth examining.

Why are we so willing to exchange control for convenience?

That question extends far beyond Linux. It concerns smartphones, social networks, cloud computing, streaming services, artificial intelligence and almost every other major technological development of our time. The more technology becomes integrated into ordinary life, the less visible the decisions behind it become.

And perhaps that is the most important cultural question raised by Linux.

Not whether Linux can replace Windows.

Not whether Ubuntu is better than Debian or Mint.

Not whether one desktop environment looks more elegant than another.

The deeper question is whether we still consider it important to have a choice about how our technology works.

Because freedom is not only the freedom to choose something.

It is also the freedom to refuse it.

It is the freedom to leave.

It is the freedom to change your mind.

It is the freedom to examine what you are using.

It is the freedom to say, “I do not accept this arrangement.”

Most importantly, it is the freedom to decide whether convenience is worth the price.

Linux does not give us a final answer to that question. It probably cannot. What it gives us is an environment in which the question remains visible.

That alone is valuable.

We live in an age in which technology increasingly tries to disappear into the background. The best system, we are often told, is the one we never have to think about. Perhaps there is some truth in that. But a technology that becomes invisible can also become unquestioned.

Linux keeps a little of the machinery visible.

It reminds us that software is made by people. It reminds us that systems can be modified. It reminds us that communities can build things without owning them in the traditional commercial sense. It reminds us that the user can sometimes be more than a consumer.

None of this makes Linux a utopia.

It makes Linux an interesting experiment.

And perhaps that is enough.

The point of this article is not to convince you that Linux is the answer. It is to ask whether we have become too comfortable with a world in which someone else has already decided what the questions are.

Because before we can decide what kind of computer we want, we have to decide something more fundamental.

How much freedom do we actually want?

And perhaps the more uncomfortable question is this:

How much are we willing to give up to avoid the inconvenience of having it?


How to cite this post:

Ahmed, O. (2026). What Is Freedom and Why Linux Means Freedom? Notes on Language and Artificial Intelligence, I(6). https://turkoloji.net/notes/i6-what-is-freedom-and-why-linux-means-freedom

I(5) The Future of Academic Writing in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Academic writing is entering a new phase of technological transformation, but the relationship between scholarship and technology is not new.

For decades, researchers have used computers, digital archives, reference management systems, and various software tools to support the creation and evaluation of academic texts. Artificial intelligence (AI) represents a continuation of this long process. The difference is that previous tools mainly assisted human actions. The widespread use of large language models  (LLMs) has already changed how researchers write papers, prepare reviews, summarize literature, and communicate scientific ideas. The question is no longer whether artificial intelligence will become part of academic work. It already has.

The more important question is: what will academic writing become when both humans and machines participate in the production of knowledge?

Many researchers now use AI systems as writing assistants. They ask them to improve sentences, restructure arguments, suggest references, review manuscripts, or evaluate the clarity of academic texts. In this sense, AI has become a new layer in the scholarly process. It is not simply a tool for correcting grammar anymore. It is more than that, for sure. It increasingly participates in the organization and development of ideas.

This creates a new and somewhat unusual situation.

Academic texts produced with the assistance of AI may later become part of the broader information environment used to develop future generations of language models. Conversations between researchers and AI systems, when collected and used under appropriate conditions, may influence how future models understand academic language, argumentation, and scientific communication. The boundary between human generated and machine assisted knowledge production may therefore become increasingly complex.

However, the existence of AI generated text does not mean the disappearance of human authorship.

A text is not only a sequence of well connected sentences. Academic writing is also a decision about what matters. It requires curiosity, judgment, theoretical perspective, and responsibility. These elements remain human. For now.

As Bender et al. (2021) emphasize, language models generate text by identifying patterns in large datasets rather than by possessing understanding or independent intentions. Their ability to produce convincing academic language should not be confused with scientific agency.

This distinction is essential.

An LLM can help a researcher write an article. It can suggest possible arguments. It can even identify weaknesses in a manuscript. But it will never independently enter the academic world as a researcher. It will never send a message saying: “I have written a paper about this topic. Would you like to become the author?”

The initiative remains human.

The future of academic writing will probably not be a competition between humans and machines. It will be a collaboration in which the roles are different. AI systems may become extremely advanced assistants, capable of processing enormous amounts of information and supporting complex intellectual tasks. Humans, however, will remain responsible for asking meaningful questions, interpreting results, and deciding whether an idea contributes something valuable to knowledge.

This transformation will also affect peer review. AI tools may assist reviewers by identifying methodological problems, language issues, missing information, or inconsistencies. Nevertheless, academic evaluation is not only a technical process. A good review requires understanding the importance of an idea, the originality of an approach, and the contribution of a work to a specific field.

Van Dis et al. (2023) argue that AI systems such as ChatGPT create both opportunities and risks for research. Their usefulness depends largely on responsible human oversight and clear academic standards.

Therefore, future universities and research institutions will need new principles for transparency. Researchers may need to disclose how AI tools were used, especially when they contribute significantly to writing, analysis, or evaluation. The central issue will not be whether AI was used, but how it was used.

The future scholar may write differently. The future paper may be produced through a dialogue between human and machine. The process of writing may become less individual and more interactive.

But the final intellectual responsibility will remain with the human author.

Ideas need owners. Arguments need defenders. Knowledge needs people who believe that a question is worth asking.

Artificial intelligence may become a powerful partner in academic writing. It may accelerate discovery and reshape scholarly communication. Yet the direction of knowledge will continue to depend on human imagination, human judgment, and, especially, human curiosity.

Or we need weekness in the text, so we convince everybody that the text is entirely human-written?


References

Bender, E. M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A., & Shmitchell, S. (2021). On the dangers of stochastic parrots: Can language models be too big? Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 610–623. https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922

Van Dis, E. A. M., Bollen, J., Zuidema, W., van Rooij, R., & Bockting, C. L. (2023). ChatGPT: Five priorities for research. Nature, 614, 224–226. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-023-00288-7


How to cite this post:

Ahmed, O. (2026). The Future of Academic Writing in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. Notes on Language and Artificial Intelligence, I(5). http://turkoloji.net/notes/i5-the-future-of-academic-writing-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence

I(4) ÜSKÜP TÜRK AĞZINDA “X GİBİ” YAPILAR VE STANDART TÜRKİYE TÜRKÇESİNDEN ANLAM SAPMALARI

Üsküp Türk ağzında “X gibi” yapısı, standart Türkiye Türkçesindeki benzetme işlevinin ötesine geçerek kalıplaşmış anlam genişlemeleri ve yerel semantik yoğunlaşmalar üretir. Bu yapı, yalnızca benzetme kurmakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda topluluk içi değerlendirme, niteleme ve kültürel kodlama işlevi de üstlenir.

Bu ağızda aşağıdaki örnekler belirli anlam kalıplaşmalarını göstermektedir.

[1] “güna gibi”
Standart Türkçede olsaydı, “günah gibi” olurdu. Bu ifade anlamsal kayma ile “acınacak durumda, zayıf ve kötü halde” anlamına sabitlenmiştir.
“Oturmiş orda güna gibi.”

[2] “rak gibi”
Makedonca “рак”/”rak” (yengeç) etkisiyle gelişmiş olup renk yoğunluğu ve aşırılık bildiren bir pekiştirme işlevi kazanarak “aşırı derecede kırmızı” anlamında kullanılır.
“Yüzi güneşten rak gibi olmiş idi.”

[3] “Nasradin gibi”
Nasrettin Hoca figürünün yerel yeniden yorumlanmasına dayanır ve “kurnaz, uyanık ve pratik zekâsı güçlü kişi” anlamını taşır.
“Kenardan bakaydi Nasradin gibi.”

[4] “çarık gibi”
Standart dilde somut nesne benzetmesi iken yerel kullanımda “esnek, kolay şekil alan fakat kopmayan yapı” anlamına dönüşmüştür.
“Bu ekmek çarık gibi bayat.”

[5] “yag gibi”
“Tereyağı gibi” anlamının genişlemiş biçimi olup özellikle erkeklerde takım elbise bağlamında “düzgün, pürüzsüz ve estetik biçimde duran (bir takım elbise)” anlamında kullanılır.
“Üstündeki rubalar yag gibi.”

[6] “ilân gibi”
Standart “yılan gibi” benzetmesinin yerel fonetik uyarlamasıdır ve “hızlı, çevik ve ele avuca sığmayan” anlamını ifade eder.
“Kütek yeecek, kaçaydi ilân gibi.”

[7] “Draçova gâuri gibi”
“Draçova gâvuru gibi” yerel sosyo-kültürel algıya dayalı stereotipik bir yapı olup “çok kötü, kaba, pis, uygunsuz ve dinsiz” anlamına sabitlenmiştir. “Draçova”, Üsküp’te bir semtin (eskiden bir köyün) adıdır.
“Kirli Draçova gâuri gibi.”

Genel olarak Üsküp Türk ağzındaki bu yapılar, “gibi” benzetme edatının semantik sınırlarını genişleterek, yerel kültürel deneyim, çok dilli temas ve tarihsel hafızanın birleşimiyle anlamı kalıplaştıran özel bir ifade sistemi oluşturur. Bu durum, Balkan Türk ağızlarında görülen yoğun temas kaynaklı anlamların yeniden yapılandırmanın tipik bir örneğini teşkil eder.


How to cite this post:

Ahmed, O. (2026). Üsküp Türk Ağzında “X gibi” Yapılar ve Standart Türkiye Türkçesinden Anlam Sapmaları. Notes on Language and Artificial Intelligence, I(4). https://turkoloji.net/notes/i4-uskup-turk-agzinda-x-gibi-yapilar-ve-standart-turkiye-turkcesinden-anlam-sapmalari

I(3) AI Systems and the Limits of Bilingual Sentence Interpretation: A Linguistic Perspective

Artificial intelligence systems that process natural language have now achieved remarkable performance in monolingual tasks. However, this is not the case under all circumstances. Their capacity to interpret bilingual or mixed language sentences remains structurally constrained. This is especially true when it comes to the Macedonian Turkish dialects that fall within the boundaries of the Balkan Sprachbund. This limitation is not primarily a matter of vocabulary size or training data volume. It concerns how meaning is represented in statistical language models. Small and underrepresented languages are even more affected.

A useful set of examples, collected by the author in the Turkish dialect of Skopje, can be observed in mixed Turkish and Macedonian influenced varieties, particularly in related urban bilingual environments:

[1] “Bügün gittım snimanyeye Televiziyada.”

In its intended interpretation, this sentence refers to attending a television recording session today. The lexical item “snimanye” corresponds to the Macedonian noun “снимање,” meaning “recording,” while “televiziyada” refers to a television broadcasting institution or studio context, with locative case marking at the end. Locative case marking is often used as dative case in the Turkish dialects in North Macedonia (Ахмед, 2004, p. 57). A human bilingual speaker reconstructs the meaning by integrating Turkish morphosyntax with Macedonian lexical insertions and pragmatic knowledge of media production environments.

Additional examples from Skopje Turkish dialect usage further illustrate this phenomenon:

[2] “Klikala te buni.”

Intended meaning: “Click exactly this one.” This reflects a hybrid structure where a Macedonian derived verb form is integrated into a Turkish communicative imperative context.

[3] “Maksıma ver tsırtalasın, em bitti dovasi.”

Intended meaning: “Give a child to draw, and that’s it.” Here, “tsırtalamak” derives from Macedonian “црта” (to draw) verb, integrated into a Turkish verbal framework, while the clause structure reflects conversational compression typical of bilingual speech.

Verbs “klikalamak” and “tsırtalamak” given in the examples [2] and [3] are copied verbs (Ahmed, 2016). Sentences of this type are not consistently and accurately translated by currently available large language models.

These examples demonstrate that bilingual speech in contact zones is not random lexical mixing but a structured communicative system shaped by long term language contact, cognitive economy, pragmatic inference and sense of being part of a society.

Current AI systems typically process such input through token segmentation and probabilistic association. While they may approximate meaning under favorable conditions, they do not reliably reconstruct the intended cross linguistic mapping when orthography is inconsistent or when lexical boundaries shift across languages within a single clause. As Grosjean (1982) argues in his foundational work on bilingualism, bilingual speech is not a mixture of two monolingual systems but a fully integrated communicative mode. This integration poses a structural challenge for models trained primarily on monolingual distributions or artificially segmented multilingual corpora.

From a computational perspective, modern large language models are built on the transformer architecture, which processes token sequences through learned statistical regularities via self attention mechanisms (Vaswani et al., 2017). Although multilingual pretraining improves robustness, it does not guarantee stable interpretation of hybrid forms where phonetic spelling, code switching, and pragmatic compression occur simultaneously. Zhang et al. (2023) found that multilingual large language models are not yet competent code switchers.

Muysken (2000) similarly demonstrates that code switching is rule governed and context sensitive, not random mixture.

This implies that correct interpretation requires not only lexical alignment but also discourse level inference, which remains an area of partial competence for current AI systems. Newer evaluation work supports this directly. Mohamed et al. (2025) note that existing benchmarks concentrate on surface level tasks such as language identification, sentiment, and part of speech tagging, leaving deeper semantic and reasoning capacities largely untested. Sheth et al. (2025) catalog ongoing evaluation efforts across more than 300 studies and identify open problems that remain unresolved despite continued progress in multilingual pretraining. These findings, drawn from evaluations published in 2025, reinforce the original argument empirically. The structural limitation is not primarily about scale or vocabulary coverage. It concerns how statistical models represent meaning when two linguistic systems are genuinely fused rather than alternated, a distinction that matters directly for dialect contact zones such as the Balkan Sprachbund.

In all the provided examples, a human bilingual speaker reconstructs meaning through a combination of phonological approximation and shared cultural context. And pragmatic inference, too. The system identifies “snimanye” with recording contexts, “tsırtalamak” with drawing activity, and interprets mixed imperatives such as “Klikala te buni” within a situational frame of digital interaction.

The limitation observed here is not the absence of bilingual data in training, but the absence of grounded pragmatic interpretation that dynamically integrates cross linguistic cues in real time. As a result, AI systems may produce plausible monolingual interpretations while missing the intended bilingual communicative act.

This distinction is critical for applications in low resource language contexts, dialectal variation, and informal digital communication, where hybrid linguistic forms are common. It also suggests that future improvements in AI language understanding will require deeper integration of discourse modeling, pragmatic inference, and structured representations of bilingual speech behavior.


References

Ахмед, О. (2004). Морфосинтакса на турските говори од Охридско Преспанскиот регион. Необјавена докторска дисертација. Филолошки факултет „Блаже Конески“, Универзитет „Св. Кирил и Методиј“, Скопје.

Ahmed, O. (2016). Copied verbs in Turkish dialects of Macedonia. In E. Á. Csató, B. Karakoç, & A. Menz (Eds.), The Uppsala Meeting: Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Turkish Linguistics (pp. 9–18). Harrassowitz Verlag.

Mohamed, A., Zhang, Y., Vazirgiannis, M., & Shang, G. (2025). Lost in the mix: Evaluating LLM understanding of code-switched text. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.14012

Sheth, R., Sinha, S. R., Patil, M., Beniwal, H., & Singh, M. (2025). Beyond monolingual assumptions: A survey of code-switched NLP in the era of large language models across modalities. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.07037

Vaswani, A., Shazeer, N., Parmar, N., Uszkoreit, J., Jones, L., Gomez, A. N., Kaiser, Ł., & Polosukhin, I. (2017). Attention is all you need. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30 (pp. 5998–6008).

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How to cite this post:

Ahmed, O. (2026). AI systems and the limits of bilingual sentence interpretation: A linguistic perspective. Notes on Language and Artificial Intelligence, I(3). https://turkoloji.net/notes/i3-ai-systems-and-the-limits-of-bilingual-sentence-interpretation-a-linguistic-perspective/